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Central Intelligence Agency	
Washington, D. C. 20505	
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE	
7 April 1986	
Egypt: Political-Economic Update	25 <b>X</b> 1
Summary	
The Mubarak regime has weathered the recent police riots, but more troubles loom on the horizon. If Cairo does not develop an effective strategy for handling Egypt's myriad problems, opposition activity will intensify. Meanwhile, basic economic indicators point to a further erosion of Egypt's external financial position.	25X1
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Egypt is going through a period of uneasy calm. Having survived the February police riots as a result of strong military backing, President Mubarak is trying to project an image of "business-as-usual." His opponents and the broad populace are probably expecting some major policy initiatives. Mubarak's failure in the next few months to break his image of cautious ineptness, however, is likely to reinvigorate the opposition.	
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Signs of a long, hot summer already exist. Last week, students in Asyuta hotbed of Islamic fundamentalismdefied police demands to remove Islamic posters. In the ensuing melee, one student was shot. Mubarak's decision to evacuate to Cairo the wounded student mollified the crowds for the moment. New disturbances are likely to erupt if the wounded student, who	25X1
remains in critical condition, dies.	25X1
	25X1
This memorandum was prepared by	
the Egypt-Sudan Branch, Arab-Israeli Division, Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. Information as of 7 April 1986	25 <b>X</b> 1
was used in its preparation. Questions and comments should be directed to Chief, Arab-Israeli Division,	25X1
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The reform measures announced by the government in late March fall considerably short of what is required to deal with the economic crisis. Most of the proposed changes, largely tax increases directed at the middle class and some customs reforms will, at best, restrain the growth of government budget deficits; they will not effectively address the more serious balance of payments problem. Among the glaring omissions of this reform package are:

- No mention of any progress toward a unified exchange rate.
- -- No specific measures to curb imports or boost exports by undertaking structural reform of the subsidy system or revamping the inefficient public sector industries.

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	25X1
No significant energy price increases.	25X1
The government has left open the door for further and perhaps more far reaching reforms in coming months. The current tenor of Cairo's thinking on economic reform is not encouraging.	
Mubarak's adamant refusal to consider entering into a serious dialogue with the IMF/IBRD represents a major mistake and one that could spark a financial crisis later this year. The foreign banking community's confidence in Egypt's ability to service short-term debt could erode to such an extent that it	

would trigger foreign banks into cutting their short-term lending to Egypt. If this occurs, Cairo will be hard pressed to finance immediate import needs and a full blown economic crisis will be

at hand.

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